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Abstract. Quantitative information flow (QIF) is traditionally defined
as the expected value of information leakage over all feasible program
runs and it fails to identify vulnerable programs where only limited num-
ber of runs leak large amount of information. As discussed in Bielova
(2016), a good notion for dynamic leakage and an efficient way of com-
puting the leakage are needed. To address this problem, the authors have
already proposed two notions for dynamic leakage and a method of quan-
tifying dynamic leakage based on model counting. Inspired by the work
of Kawamoto et. al. (2017), this paper proposes two efficient methods
for computing dynamic leakage, a compositional method along with the
sequential structure of a program and a parallel computation based on
the value domain decomposition. For the former, we also investigate both
exact and approximated calculations. From the perspective of implemen-
tation, we utilize binary decision diagrams (BDDs) and deterministic
decomposable negation normal forms (d-DNNFs) to represent Boolean
formulas in model counting. Finally, we show experimental results on
several examples.
Keywords: Dynamic leakage · Composition · Quantitative Information
Flow · BDD · d-DNNF.
1 Introduction
Since first coined by [13] in 1982, noninterference property has become the main
criterion for software security. A program is said to satisfy noninterference if
any change in confidential information does not affect a publicly observable
output of that program. However, noninterference is so strict that it blocks many
useful, yet practically safe systems and protocols, such as password checkers,
anonymous voting protocols, recommendation systems and so forth. Quantitative
information flow (QIF) was introduced to loosen security criterion in the sense
that, instead of seeking if there is a case that a confidential input affects a
public output, computing how large that effect is. That is, if QIF of a program
is insignificant, the program is still judged as secure. Because of its flexibility,
QIF gains much attention in recent years. But it has an inherent shortcoming
as shown in the example below.
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Example 1.1. Consider the following program taken from [8].
if source < 16 then output← 8 + source
else output← 8
Assume source to be a non-negative 32-bits integer which is uniformly dis-
tributed on that domain, then there are 16 possible values of output, from 8
to 23. Observing any number between 9 and 23 as an output reveals everything
about the confidential source, whilst observing 8 leaks small information; there
are many possible values of source (0, 16, 17, 18, . . . , 232− 1) which produce 8 as
the output. QIF is defined as the average of the leakage over all possible cases
and fails to capture the above situation because we cannot distinguish vulner-
able and secure cases if we take the average. Hence, as argued in [3], a notion
for dynamic leakage should reflect individual leakage caused by observing an
output.
As illustrated in Figure 1, there are two different scenarios of quantifying
dynamic leakage. We call the first scenario, which corresponds to diagram (A),
Compute-on-Demand (CoD), and the second, which corresponds to diagram
(B), Construct-in-Advance (CiA). A box surrounded by bold lines represents
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Fig. 1. (A): Compute-on-Demand, (B): Construct-in-Advance.
a heavy-weighted process, which requires much computing resource. The main
difference between (A) and (B) is the relative position of the heavy-weighted
process, i.e., whether (A) to put the process after augmenting an observed output
and then run the process each time we need (on demand) to compute dynamic
leakage, or (B) to put the process before augmenting an observed output (in
advance) so that we should run the process only once for one program. In CoD,
the heavy-weighted process is a projected model counting, for which off-the-shelf
tools such as SharpCDCL [29], DSharp-p [24] and GPMC [25] can be used. In
CiA, the heavy-weighted process is the one that generates BDD [20] or d-DNNF
[11], which are data structures to represent Boolean formulas. Generally, it takes
time to generate BDD or d-DNNF but counting all solutions (models) by using
them is easy. CiA takes the full advantage of this characteristic. Consider again
Example 1.1 above. The set of all feasible pairs of (source, output) is 232. Even for
such a simple program, using BDD or d-DNNF to store all those pairs is quite
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daunting in terms of both memory space and speed. Therefore, for programs
with simple structure but a large number of input and output pairs, CoD works
better than CiA. On the other hand, CiA is preferable to CoD when quantifying
dynamic leakage is required many times on the same program. However, CoD
or CiA alone is not a solution to the problem of scalability.
In this paper, we introduce two compositional methods for computing dy-
namic leakage inspired by the work of Kawamoto et al. [14] on the compositional-
ity of static leakage. One is to utilize the sequential structure of a given program
P = P1;P2. We first analyze P2 and then compute the leakage of P by analyzing
P1 based on the result on P2. For the sequential composition, beside the benign
yet time-consuming exact counting based on Breadth-First-Search (BFS), we
also investigate an approximated approach. For upper bound of the count, we
leverage the results on each sub-program by Max#SAT in [12]. For lower bound
of the count, we simply use Depth-First-Search (DFS) with timeout, i.e., DFS
will stop when the execution time exceeds the predetermined timeout.
The other method we propose is based on the decomposition of the value
domain of a program. For example, we divide the input domain as I = I1 ∪ I2
and the output domain as O = O1 ∪ O2 of a program P (I,O), compute the
leakages for P (Ii, Oj) for i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2, and then compute the leakage of
the whole program P (I,O) from them. This value domain based decomposition
has two merits. First, it is flexible yet simple to adjust the components. Secondly,
the exact dynamic leakage of the composed program can be simply derived by
taking the sum of those of its components. Despite the number of components
can be large, this approach is promising with parallel computing.
In summary, the contributions of this research are four-fold:
– We propose a compositional method for dynamic leakage computation based
on the sequential structure inside a given program and the composability of
the leakage of the whole program from those of subprograms.
– We propose another compositional method based on value domains, which
is suitable for parallel computing.
– We propose an approximated approach where we upper bound the count
using Max#SAT problem and lower bound the count by DFS with prede-
termined timeout.
– We prototype a tool that can do parallel computation based on value do-
main decomposition and both exact counting and approximated counting for
the sequential composition. By using the tool, we investigate feasibility and
advantages of the proposed compositional methods for computing dynamic
leakage of several examples.
Related work Definitions of QIF: Smith [19] gives a comprehensive summary
on entropy-based QIF, such as Shannon entropy, guessing entropy and min en-
tropy and compares them in various scenarios. Clarkson et al. [9], on the other
hand, include attacker’s belief into their model. Alvim et al. introduce gain func-
tion to generalize information leakage by separating the probability distribution
and the impact of individual information. Computational Complexity: Yasuoka
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and Terauchi [22] prove complexity on computing QIF, including PP -hardness
of precisely quantifying QIF for loop-free Boolean programs. Chadha and Um-
mels [6] show that the QIF bounding problem of recursive Boolean programs is
EXPTIME-complete. Precise Calculation: In [15], Klebanov et al. reduce QIF
calculation to #SAT problem projected on a specific set of variables. On the
other hand, Phan et al. [18] reduce QIF calculation to ]SMT problem to lever-
age existing SMT (satisfiability modulo theory) solvers. Recently, Val et al. [21]
reported a SAT-based method that can scale to programs of 10,000 lines of
code. Approximated Calculation: Approximation is a reasonable alternative for
scalability. Ko¨pf and Rybalchenko [16] propose approximated QIF computation
by sandwiching the precise QIF with lower and upper bounds using random-
ization and abstraction, respectively, with a provable confidence. LeakWatch of
Chothia et al. [7], also give approximation with provable confidence by execut-
ing a program multiple times. Its descendant called HyLeak [5] combines the
randomization strategy of its ancestor with precise analysis. Biondi et al. [4] uti-
lize ApproxMC2, which provides approximation on the number of models of a
Boolean formula in CNF by Markov Chain Monte Carlo method. Composition of
QIF: Another attempt to the scalability is to break the system down into smaller
fragments. In [14], Kawamoto et al. introduce two parallel compositions: with
distinct inputs and with shared inputs, and give theoretical bounds on the leak-
age of the main program using those of the constituted sub-programs. Though
our research was motivated by [14], we focus on a sequential structure of a tar-
get program and a decomposition of the value domain of the program while [14]
uses a parallel structure of the target. Dynamic Leakage: Bielova ([3]) discusses
the importance of dynamic leakage and argues that any well-known QIF notion
is not appropriate as a notion for dynamic leakage. Recently, we proposed two
notions for dynamic leakage, QIF1 and QIF2 and give some results on compu-
tational complexity as well as a quantifying method based on model counting
[8].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We will review the definition
of dynamic leakage and assume our program model in Section 2. Section 3 is
dedicated to a method for computing dynamic leakage based on the sequen-
tial composition and also propose approximation methods. Section 4 proposes a
parallel computation method based on value domain decomposition. Section 5
evaluates the proposed compositional methods including the comparison of CiA
vs. CoD and exact vs. approximated computation based on the experimental
results. Then the paper is concluded in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Dynamic leakage
The standard notion for static quantitative information flow (QIF) is defined as
the mutual information between random variables S for secret input and O for
observable output:
QIF = H(S)−H(S|O) (1)
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where H(S) is the entropy of S and H(S|O) is the expected value of H(S|o),
which is the conditional entropy of S when observing an output o. Shannon
entropy and min-entropy are often used as the definition of entropy, and in
either case, H(S)−H(S|O) ≥ 0 always holds by the definition.
In [3], the author discusses the appropriateness of the existing measures for
dynamic QIF and points out their drawbacks, especially, each of these measures
may become negative. Hereafter, let S and O denote the finite sets of input
values and output values, respectively.
Let P be a program with secret input variable S and observable output vari-
able O. For notational convenience, we identify the names of program variables
with the corresponding random variables. Throughout the paper, we assume
that a program always terminates. The syntax and semantics of programs as-
sumed in this paper will be given in the next section. For s ∈ S and o ∈ O, let
pSO(s, o), pO|S(o|s), pS|O(s|o), pS(s), pO(o) denote the joint probability of s ∈ S
and o ∈ O, the conditional probability of o ∈ O given s ∈ S (the likelihood),
the conditional probability of s ∈ S given o ∈ O (the posterior probability), the
marginal probability of s ∈ S (the prior probability) and the marginal probabil-
ity of o ∈ O, respectively. We often omit the subscripts as p(s, o) and p(o|s) if
they are clear from the context. By definition, p(s, o) = p(s|o)p(o) = p(o|s)p(s),
p(o) =
∑
s∈S p(s, o), p(s) =
∑
o∈O p(s, o).
We assume that (the source code of) P and the prior probability p(s) (s ∈ S)
are known to an attacker. For o ∈ O, let preP (o) = {s ∈ S | p(s|o) > 0}, which
is called the preimage of o (by the program P ).
Considering the discussions in the literature, we define new notions for dy-
namic QIF that satisfy the following requirements [8]:
(R1) Dynamic QIF should be always non-negative because an attacker obtains
some information (although sometimes very small or even zero) when he
observes an output of the program.
(R2) It is desirable that dynamic QIF is independent of a secret input s ∈ S. Oth-
erwise, the controller of the system may change the behavior for protection
based on the estimated amount of the leakage that depends on s, which may
be a side channel for an attacker.
(R3) The new notion should be compatible with the existing notions when we
restrict ourselves to special cases such as deterministic programs, uniformly
distributed inputs, and taking the expected value.
The first notion is the self-information of the secret inputs consistent with an
observed output o ∈ O. Equivalently, the attacker can narrow down the possible
secret inputs after observing o to the preimage of o by the program. We consider
the self-information of s ∈ S after the observation as the probability of s divided
by the sum of the probabilities of the inputs in the preimage of o (see the upper
part of Fig. 2).
QIFP1 (o) = − log(
∑
s′∈preP (o)
p(s′)). (2)
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Fig. 2. QIF1 (the upper) and QIF2 (the lower)
The second notion is the self-information of the joint events s′ ∈ S and an
observed output o ∈ O (see the lower part of Fig. 2). This is equal to the the
self-information of o.
QIFP2 (o) = − log(
∑
s′∈S
p(s′, o)) = − log p(o) = − log p(s, o) + log p(s|o). (3)
Both notions are defined by considering how much possible secret input values
are reduced by observing an output. We propose two notions because there is a
trade-off between the easiness of calculation and the appropriateness [8].
Theorem 2.1 ([8]). If a program P is deterministic, for every o ∈ O and s ∈ S,
QIFP1 (o) = QIF
P
2 (o) = − log p(o).
If input values are uniformly distributed, QIFP1 (o) = log
|S|
|preP (o)| for every o ∈O.
2.2 Program model
We assume probabilistic programs where every variable stores a natural number
and the syntactical constructs are assignment to a variable, conditional, proba-
bilistic choice, while loop and concatenation:
b ::= ⊥ | > | ¬b | b ∨ b | e < e
e ::= X | n | e + e
c ::= skip | X ← e | if b then c else c end
| c r[]1−r c | while b do c end | c; c
where <,X, n,+ stand for a binary relation on natural numbers, a program
variable, a constant natural number and a binary operation on natural numbers,
respectively, and r is a constant rational number representing the branching
probability for a choice command where 0 ≤ r ≤ 1. In the above BNFs, ob-
jects derived from the syntactical categories b, e and c are called conditions,
expressions and commands, respectively. A command X ← e assigns the value
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of expression e to variable X. A command c1 r[]1−r c2 means that the program
chooses c1 with probability r and c2 with probability 1− r. Note that this is the
only probabilistic command. The semantics of the other constructs are defined
in the usual way.
A program P has the following syntax:
P ::= in S; out O; local Z; c | P ;P
where S,O,Z are sequences of variables which are disjoint from one another.
A program is required to satisfy the following constraints on variables. We first
define In(P ), Out(P ), Local(P ) for a program P as follows.
– If P = in S; out O; local Z; c, we define In(P ) = {V | V appears in S},
Out(P ) = {V | V appears in O} and Local(P ) = {V | V appears in Z}. In
this case, we say P is a simple program. We require that no varible in In(P )
appears in the left-hand side of an assignment command in P , i.e., any input
variable is not updated.
– If P = P1;P2, we define In(P ) = In(P1), Out(P ) = Out(P2) where we
require that In(P2) = Out(P1) holds. We also define Local(P ) = Local(P1)∪
Local(P2) ∪Out(P1).
A program P is also written as P (S,O) where S and O are enumerations of In(P )
and Out(P ), respectively. A program P1;P2 represents the sequential composi-
tion of P1 and P2. Note that the semantics of P1;P2 is defined in the same way as
that of the concatenation of commands c1; c2 except that the input and output
variables are not always shared by P1 and P2 in the sequential composition. If a
program does not have a probabilistic choice, it is deterministic.
3 Sequential composition
This section proposes a method of computing both exact and approximated
dynamic leakage by using sequential composition. While the formula in exact
calculation can be used for both probabilistic and deterministic programs, we
consider only deterministic programs with uniformly distributed input.
3.1 Exact calculation
For a program P (S,O), an input value s ∈ S and a subset S ′ of input values, let
postP (s) = {o | p(o|s) > 0},
postP (S ′) =
⋃
s∈S′
postP (s).
If P is deterministic and postP (s) = {o}, we write postP (s) = o.
Let P = P1;P2 be a program. We assume that In(P1), Out(P1), In(P2), Out(P2)
are all singleton sets for simplicity. This assumption does not lose general-
ity; for example, if In(P1) contains more than one variables, we instead in-
troduce a new input variable that stores the tuple consisting of a value of each
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variable in In(P1). Let In(P ) = In(P1) = {S}, Out(P1) = In(P2) = {T},
Out(P ) = Out(P2) = {O}, and let S, T ,O be the corresponding sets of values,
respectively. For a given o ∈ O, preP (o) and p(o), which are needed to compute
QIFP1 (o) and QIF
P
2 (o), (see (2) and (3)) can be represented in terms of those of
P1 and P2 as follows.
preP (o) =
⋃
t∈(preP2 (o)∩postP1 (S))
preP1(t), (4)
p(o) =
∑
s∈S,t∈T
p(s)p1(t|s)p2(o|t). (5)
If p(s) is given, we can compute (4) by enumerating the sets T and preP1(t)
for t ∈ (preP2(o) ∩ postP1(S)) and also for (5). This approach can easily be
generalized to the sequential composition of more than two programs, in which
the enumeration is proceeded in Breadth-First-Search fashion. However, in this
approach, search space will often explode rapidly and lose the advantage of
composition. Therefore we come up with approximation, which is explained in
the next subsection, as an alternative.
3.2 Approximation
Let us assume that P (S,O) is deterministic and S is uniformly distributed. In
this subsection, we will derive both upper-bound and lower-bound of |preP (o)|
which provides lower-bound and upper-bound of QIFP1 (o) = QIF
P
2 (o) respec-
tively. In general, our method can be applied to the sequential composition of
more than two sub-programs.
3.2.1 Lower bound
To infer a lower bound of |preP (o)|, we leverage Depth-First-Search (DFS) with
a predefined timeout such that the algorithm will stop when the execution time
exceeds the timeout and output the current result as the lower bound. The
method is illustrated in Algorithm 1. The problem is defined as: given a program
P = P1;P2; · · · ;Pn, an observable output o of the last sub-program Pn and
a predetermined timeout, derive a lower bound of |preP (o)| by those n sub-
programs.
In Algorithm 1, CountPre(Q, o) counts |preQ(o)|, PickNotSelected(Pre[i])
select an element of Pre[i] that has not been traversed yet or returns AllSe-
lected if there is no such element, and EnumeratePre(Pi, v) lists all elements in
prePi(v). Pre[i] stores prePi(oi) for some oi. For P1, it is not necessary to store
its preimage because we need only the size of the preimage. Lines 1 to 5 are
for initialization. Line 6 enumerates prePn(o). Lines 7 to 21 constitute the main
loop of the algorithm, which is stopped either when the counting is done or when
time is up. When level = 1, lines 8 to 11 are executed and CountPre will return
preP1(Stack.top) in which Stack.top is the input of P2 that leads to output o of
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Algorithm 1 LowerBound(P1, · · · , Pn, o, timeout)
1: Pre[2..n]← empty
2: Stack ← empty
3: level← n
4: acc count← 0
5: Push(Stack, o)
6: Pre[n]← EnumeratePre(Pn, o)
7: while not Stack.empty and execution time < timeout do
8: if level = 1 then
9: acc count← acc count+ CountPre(P1, Stack.top)
10: level← level + 1
11: Pop(Stack)
12: else
13: v ← PickNotSelected(Pre[level])
14: if v = AllSelected then
15: level← level + 1
16: Pop(Stack)
17: else
18: Push(Stack, v)
19: level← level − 1
20: if level > 1 then
21: Pre[level]← EnumeratePre(Plevel, v)
22: return acc count
Pn, then back-propagate; lines 13 to 16 check if all elements in the preimage set
of the current level is already considered and if so, back-propagate, otherwise
push the next element onto the top of Stack and go to the next level.
Theorem 3.1. In Algorithm 1, if P1, · · · , Pn are deterministic, acc count, which
is returned at line 22, is a lower bound of the preimage size of o by P1, · · · , Pn.
3.2.2 Upper bound
For an upper bound of |preP (o)| we use Max#SAT problem [12], which is defined
as follows.
Definition 3.1. Given a propositional formula ϕ(X,Y, Z) over sets of variables
X, Y and Z, the Max#SAT problem is to determine maxX#Y.∃Z.ϕ(X,Y, Z).
Let us consider a program Q, In(Q), Out(Q) and Local(Q) as ϕ, Y , X and Z
respectively. Then, the solution X to the Max#SAT problem can be interpreted
as the output value which has the biggest size of its preimage set. In other
words, |maxX#Y.∃Z.ϕ(X,Y, Z)| is an upper bound of preQ over all feasible
outputs. Therefore, the product of those upper bounds of |prePi | over all i(1 ≤
i ≤ n) is obviously an upper bound of |preP |. Algorithm 2 computes this upper
bound where CountPre(Pn, o) returns the size of the preimage of o by Pn;
MaxCount(Pi) computes the answer to the Max#SAT problem for program Pi.
We used the tool developed by the authors of [12], which produces estimated
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bounds of Max#SAT with tunable confidence and precision. As explained in
[12], the tool samples output values of k-fold self-composition of the original
program. The greater k is, the more precise the estimation is, but also the more
complicated the calculation of each sampling is. Note that MaxCount(Pi) can
be computed in advance only once.
Algorithm 2 UpperBound(P1, · · · , Pn, o)
1: Result← CountPre(Pn, o)
2: for i← 1 to n do
3: Result← Result ∗MaxCount(Pi)
4: return Result
Theorem 3.2. In Algorithm 2, if P1, · · · , Pn are deterministic, Result, which is
returned at line 4, is an upper bound of the preimage size of o by P1, · · · , Pn.
4 Value domain decomposition
Another effective method for computing the dynamic leakage in a compositional
way is to decompose the sets of input values and output values into several
subsets, compute the leakage for the subprograms restricted to those subsets, and
compose the results to obtain the leakage of the whole program. The difference
between the parallel composition in [14] and the proposed method is that in the
former case, a program under analysis itself is divided into two subprograms
that run in parallel, and in the latter case, the computation of dynamic leakage
is conducted in parallel by decomposing the sets of input and output values.
Let P (S,O) be a program. Assume that the sets of input values and output
values, S and O, are decomposed into mutually disjoint subsets as
S = S1 unionmulti · · · unionmulti Sk,
O = O1 unionmulti · · · unionmulti Ol.
For 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ l, let Pij be the program obtained from P by
restricting the set of input values to Si and the set of output values to Oj where
if the output value o of P for an input value s ∈ Si does not belong to Oj , the
output value of Pij for input s is undefined.
By definition, for a given o ∈ Oj ,
preP (o) =
⋃
1≤i≤k
prePi,j (o). (*)
By (2) and (3), we can compute QIF1 and QIF2 in a compositional way.
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By Theorem 2.1, if P is deterministic and the prior probability of S is uni-
formly distributed, what we have to compute is |preP (o)|, which can be obtained
by summing up each |prePi,j (o)| by (*).
|preP (o)| =
∑
1≤i≤k
|prePi,j (o)|.
5 Experiments 1
This section will investigate answers for the following questions: (1) Is CiA al-
ways better than CoD or vice versa? (2) How can parallel computation based
on the value domain decomposition improve the performance? (3) How does ap-
proximation in the sequential composition work in terms of precision and speed?
We will examine those questions through a few examples.
5.1 Setting up
The experiments were conducted on Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU ES-1620 v3 @ 3.5GHz
x 8 (4 cores x 2 threads), 32GB RAM, CentOS Linux 7. For parallel computation,
we use OpenMP [10] library. At the very first phase to transform C programs
into CNFs, we leveraged the well-known CBMC[23]. For the construction of a
BDD from a CNF and the model counting and enumeration of the constructed
BDD, we use an off-the-shell tool PC2BDD [27]. We use PC2DDNNF [28] for
the d-DNNF counterpart. Both of the tools are developed by one of the authors
in another project. Besides, as an ordering of Boolean variables of a CNF greatly
affects the BDD generation performance, we utilize FORCE [1] to optimize the
ordering before transforming a CNF into a BDD. We use MaxCount [26] for esti-
mating the answer of Max#SAT problem. We implemented a tool for Algorithms
1 and 2 as well as the exact count in sequential compositions in Java.
5.2 The grade protocol
This benchmark is taken from [17]. By this experiment, we investigated answers
for questions (1) and (2) mentioned at the beginning of this section. This bench-
mark sums up (then takes the average of) the grades of a group of students
without revealing the grade of each student. We used the benchmark with 4
students and 5 grades, and all variables are of 16 bits. For model counting, we
suppose the observed output (the sum of students’ grades) to be 1, and hence
the number of models is 4. GPMC [25], one of the fastest tools for quantifying
dynamic leakage as shown in [8], was chosen as the representative tool for CoD
approach. We manually decompose the original program into 4, 8 and 32 sub-
programs by adding constraints on input and output of the program based on the
1 the benchmarks and prototype are public at:
bitbucket.org/trungchubao-nu/dla-composition/src/master/dla-composition/
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value domain decomposition (the set of output values is divided into 2 and the set
of input values is divided into 2, 4 or 16). Table 1 is divided into sub-divisions
corresponding to specific tasks: BDD construction, d-DNNF construction and
model counting based on different approaches. In each sub-division, the bold
number represents the shortest execution time in each column (i.e., the same
number of decomposed sub-programs, but different numbers of threads) and the
underlined one represents the best in that sub-division. ‘−’ represents cases
when the number of threads is greater than the number of sub-programs, which
are obviously meaningless to do experiments.
n = 32 n = 8 n = 4 n = 1
BDD Construction
t = 32 218.53s − − −
t = 16 222.27s − − −
t = 8 237.54s 137.74s − −
t = 4 254.88s 144.55s 155.90s −
t = 2 376.21s 233.34s 214.65s −
t = 1 736.74s 450.85s 391.99s 243.85s
d-DNNF Construction
t = 32 93.17s − − −
t = 16 91.49s − − −
t = 8 107.31s 123.48s − −
t = 4 141.27s 147.79s 175.34s −
t = 2 215.92s 226.93s 247.45s −
t = 1 398.99s 391.67s 457.38s 304.88s
Model Counting
(CiA - BDD based)
t = 32 0.21s − − −
t = 16 0.22s − − −
t = 8 0.25s 0.13s − −
t = 4 0.30s 0.16s 0.16s −
t = 2 0.65s 0.31s 0.24s −
t = 1 0.86s 0.36s 0.31s 0.30s
Model Counting
(CiA - d-DNNF based)
t = 32 0.05s − − −
t = 16 0.05s − − −
t = 8 0.05s 0.01s − −
t = 4 0.07s 0.01s 0.01s −
t = 2 0.12s 0.02s 0.02s −
t = 1 0.18s 0.04s 0.03s 0.25s
Model Counting
(CoD - using GPMC)
t = 1 − − − 44.69s
Table 1. Excecution time for the construction of data structures and model count-
ing of different approaches. n: number of sub-programs decomposed from the original
program; t: number of threads specified by num thread compiling directive of OpenMP.
Let us keep in mind that n = 1 means non-decomposition, t = 1 means a serial
execution and the number of physical CPUs of the hardware is 8. From Table 1,
we can infer the following conclusion:
Compositionality of Dynamic Leakage and Its Application 13
– In general, increasing the number of threads (up to the number of sub-
programs) does improve the execution time in both the construction of data
structures and the model counting.
– When the number of sub-programs is close to the number of physical CPUs
(8), the execution time is among the best if not the best.
– In this example, CiA shows a huge improvement over CoD, which is more
than 4000 times (0.01s vs. 44.69s) with the best tuning of the former. Of
course, CiA takes time in constructing data structures BDD or d-DNNF.
The performance with d-DNNF is better than that with BDD in this example,
but this seems due to the implementation of the tools.
5.3 Bit shuffle and Population count
population count is the 16-bit version of the benchmark of the same name given
in [17]. In this experiment, the original program is decomposed into three sub-
programs in such a way that each sub-program performs one bit operation of
the original. Inspired by population count, we created the benchmark bit shuffle,
which consists of two steps: firstly it counts the number of bit-ones in a given
secret number (by population count)2, then it shuffles those bits to produce an
output value. Though in Section 3, we suppose programs to be deterministic,
when it comes to calculate QIF1, the theory part works for probabilistic programs
as well. Hence, even bit shuffle is probabilistic, conducting experiments on it is
still valid.
This original program is divided into two sub-programs corresponding to
the two steps. All the original programs and the decomposed sub-programs are
provided in appendix A. As shown in Table 2, the construction time of BDD
and d-DNNF for bit shuffle was improved significantly (more than 100 times
for BDD, 8 times for d-DNNF) by the decomposition while the improvement
of population count was not large. This is because in the former case two sub-
programs are connected at a bottle-neck point, i.e., given a certain output, its
preimage by the second program always has exactly one element, which is the
number of bit-ones of that output, while in the latter case there is no such
bottle-neck point. Besides, parallel computing is available for the decomposed
sub-programs and the result is a little bit better. Probably, as the number of
sub-programs increases, the effect of parallel computing would be larger.
For model counting, we let an output value be 3 (the number of models is
13110) for bit shuffle and 7 (the number of models is 11440) for population count.
Table 3 presents the execution times for model counting where the underlined
numbers are the exact counts, the bold excution times are the best results
among approaches for the exact count of each benchmark and the italic data
are of approximated calculations. The execution times for the lower bounds are
predetermined timeouts, which were designed to be 1/2, 1/5 and 1/10 of the
time needed by the exact count, followed by the time by CoD. In bit shuffle
benchmark, lower bounds based on d-DNNF were not improved (all are zero)
2 To increase the preimage size by the first part, we took the count modulo 6.
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even the timeout was increased. This happened because an intermediate result
of counting for one d-DNNF is unknown until the counting completes while this
benchmark contains only two sub-programs and the size of the preimage by the
second sub-program is always one (i.e., the number of times to count d-DNNFs
is only two, one for the first sub-program and one for the second one).
non-decompose decompose (serial) decompose (parallel)
BDD
Construction
bit shuffle >1 hour 33.90s 33.46s
population count 0.48s 0.66s 0.40s
d-DNNF
Construction
bit shuffle 424.64s 50.28s 48.39s
population count 1.19s 0.71s 0.69s
Table 2. BDD and d-DNNF construction time for different approaches.
bit shuffle population count
CoD using GPMC 0.49s 13110 0.09s 11440
CiA-BDD based
Exact count 1.47s 13110 10.98s 11440
Approximation
Lower bound
0.75s 6243 5.5s 5776
0.30s 1918 2.2s 888
0.15s 574 1.1s 312
0.49s 3713 0.09s 0
Upper bound 0.02s 14025 0.07s 5898240
CiA-d-DNNF based
Exact count 0.27s 13110 3.50s 11440
Approximation
Lower bound
0.13s 0 1.75s 4712
0.05s 0 0.70s 1314
0.03s 0 0.35s 52
0.49s 13110 0.09s 0
Upper bound 0.07s 14025 0.13s 5898240
Table 3. Model counting: execution time and the changing of approximation precision.
From the experimental results, we obtain the following observations.
– In the previous section (grade protocol) CiA did much better than CoD
while in this section, especially for population count benchmark, CoD using
GPMC offered a huge improvement over CiA. So the answer for question (1)
is ‘No’.
– While the precision of the upper bounds was not so good, their execution
times were small. The precision could be improved by tuning the decompo-
sition. So this result could be a hint to a research on how to make a good
decomposition to benefit the upper bound approximation.
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– As expected, the lower bounds were improved as the timeout was lengthened.
Note that a lower bound of the model count corresponds to an upper bound
of QIF1. Therefore, if we set a threshold for the leakage of a program, we
only need to know whether the lower bound of the counting exceedes the
constant corresponding to the threshold, and if so, we can terminate the
analysis but still be sure about the safety of the program.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we focused on the efficient computation of dynamic leakage of
a program and considered two approaches Compute-on-Demand (CoD) and
Construct-in-Advance (CiA). Then, we proposed two compositional methods,
namely, computation along with the sequential structure of the program and
parallel computation based on value domain decomposition. In the first method,
we also proposed approximations that give both lower bound and upper bound of
model counting. Our experimental result showed that: (1) both CiA and CoD are
important because sometimes the former works better and the other times does
the latter; (2) Parallel computation based on value domain decomposition works
well generally; and (3) the precision of upper bound depends on the way of de-
composition while that of lower bound depends on the preset timeout. However,
all decomposition in the experiments were done manually and finding a system-
atical way of deciding a good decomposition is left as future work. Both BDD
and d-DNNF have many applications other than computing dynamic leakage,
but there is still a bottle neck at generating them from an object to be analyzed.
One of the approaches in this paper composition based on value domains can be
a hint to speed up that process.
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A Benchmarks
A.1 Grade protocol
A.1.1 Original program
1 typedef unsigned int s i z e t ;
2 s i z e t nondet in t ( ) ;
3 int main (void ) {
4 s i z e t S = 4 , G=5; //number o f s tudent s , number o f grades .
5 s i z e t n , output , sum = 0 , i =0, j =0, c =0;
6 s i z e t numbers [ S ] , announcements [ S ] , h [ S ] ;
7
8 n = ( (G−1)∗S) +1;
9 for ( c = 0 ; c < S ; c++) { h [ c ] = nondet in t ( ) % G;}
10 for ( c = 0 ; c < S ; c++) { numbers [ c ] = nondet in t ( ) % n ;}
11 while ( i<S) {
12 j =0;
13 while ( j<G) {
14 i f (h [ i ]== j )
15 announcements [ i ]= j+numbers [ i ]−numbers [ ( i +1)%S ] ;
16 j=j +1;
17 }
18 i=i +1;
19 }
20
21 // computing the sum , producing the output and ter min a t in g
22 for ( c = 0 ; c < S ; c++) { sum += announcements [ c ] ; }
23 output = sum % n ;
24
25 a s s e r t (0 ) ;
26 return 0 ;
27 }
Listing 1.1. grade.c
A.1.2 One of sub-programs in 32-parts decomposition
1 typedef unsigned int s i z e t ;
2 s i z e t nondet in t ( ) ;
3 int main (void ) {
4 s i z e t S = 4 , G=5; //number o f s tudent s , number o f grades .
5 s i z e t n , output , sum = 0 , i =0, j =0, c =0;
6 s i z e t numbers [ S ] , announcements [ S ] , h [ S ] ;
7
8 n = ( (G−1)∗S) +1;
9 for ( c = 0 ; c < S ; c++) { h [ c ] = nondet in t ( ) % G;}
10 CPROVER assume (h[0]>=0 && h[0] <3) ;
11 CPROVER assume (h[1]>=0 && h[1] <3) ;
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12 CPROVER assume (h[2]>=0 && h[2] <3) ;
13 CPROVER assume (h[3]>=0 && h[3] <3) ;
14 for ( c = 0 ; c < S ; c++) { numbers [ c ] = nondet in t ( ) % n ;}
15 while ( i<S) {
16 j =0;
17 while ( j<G) {
18 i f (h [ i ]== j )
19 announcements [ i ]= j+numbers [ i ]−numbers [ ( i +1)%S ] ;
20 j=j +1;
21 }
22 i=i +1;
23 }
24
25 // computing the sum , producing the output and ter min a t in g
26 for ( c = 0 ; c < S ; c++) { sum += announcements [ c ] ; }
27 output = sum % n ;
28
29 a s s e r t ( output < 0 | | output > 8) ;
30 return 0 ;
31 }
Listing 1.2. grade 32 01.c
A.2 Bit Shuffle
A.2.1 Original program
1 unsigned short int nondet in t ( ) ;
2 int main (void ) {
3 unsigned short int s , s0 , o=0, count ;
4 s0=s ;
5 s=(s&0x5555 ) +(( s>>1)&0x5555 ) ;
6 s=(s&0x3333 ) +(( s>>2)&0x3333 ) ;
7 s=(s&0x 0 f 0 f ) +(( s>>4)&0x 0 f 0 f ) ;
8 count=(s+(s>>8))&0 x f f ;
9 count=count %6;
10 unsigned short int b i t a r r [ 1 6 ] ;
11 unsigned short int i n d i c e s [ 1 6 ] ;
12
13 // i n i t i a l i z e
14 for (unsigned int i =0; i <16; i++){
15 b i t a r r [ i ]=0;
16 i n d i c e s [ i ]= i ;
17 }
18
19 // s h u f f l e
20 for (unsigned int i =16; i>16−count ; i−−) {
21 unsigned int j = nondet in t ( )%i ;
22 b i t a r r [ i n d i c e s [ j ] ] = 1 ;
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23 unsigned int temp=i n d i c e s [ j ] ;
24 i n d i c e s [ j ]= i n d i c e s [ i −1] ;
25 i n d i c e s [ i−1]=temp ;
26 }
27
28 // genera te r e s u l t
29 for (unsigned int i =0; i <16; i++) {
30 i f ( b i t a r r [ i ] == 1) o += 1 << (16 − i − 1) ;
31 }
32 return 0 ;
33 }
Listing 1.3. bit shuffle.c
A.2.2 Sub-programs
1 typedef unsigned short int g type ;
2 g type nondet in t ( ) ;
3 int main (void ) {
4 g type s , s0 ;
5 g type count ;
6
7 s0 = s ;
8 s = ( s & 0x5555 ) + ( ( s >> 1) & 0x5555 ) ;
9 s = ( s & 0x3333 ) + ( ( s >> 2) & 0x3333 ) ;
10 s = ( s & 0 x 0 f 0 f ) + ( ( s >> 4) & 0 x 0 f 0 f ) ;
11 count = ( s + ( s>>8)) & 0 x f f ;
12 count = count % 6 ;
13
14 a s s e r t (0 ) ;
15 return 0 ;
16 }
Listing 1.4. bit shuffle 2 1.c
1 typedef unsigned short int g type ;
2 g type nondet in t ( ) ;
3 int main (void ) {
4 g type o , count ;
5
6 count = count % 6 ;
7 unsigned short int b i t a r r [ 1 6 ] , i n d i c e s [ 1 6 ] ;
8
9 // i n i t i a l i z e
10 for (unsigned int i =0; i <16; i++) {
11 b i t a r r [ i ] = 0 ;
12 i n d i c e s [ i ] = i ;
13 }
14
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15 // s h u f f l e
16 for (unsigned int i =16; i>16−count ; i−−) {
17 unsigned int j = nondet in t ( ) % i ;
18 b i t a r r [ i n d i c e s [ j ] ] = 1 ;
19 // swap
20 unsigned int temp = i n d i c e s [ j ] ;
21 i n d i c e s [ j ] = i n d i c e s [ i −1] ;
22 i n d i c e s [ i −1] = temp ;
23 }
24
25 // genera te r e s u l t
26 o = 0 ;
27
28 for (unsigned int i =0; i <16; i++) { i f ( b i t a r r [ i ] == 1) o +=
1 << (16 − i − 1) ;}
29 a s s e r t (0 ) ;
30 return 0 ;
31 }
Listing 1.5. bit shuffle 2 2.c
A.3 Population Count
A.3.1 Original programs
1 int main (void ) {
2 unsigned short int S0 , S , Output ;
3 S0 = S ;
4 S = (S & 0x5555 ) + ( ( S >> 1) & 0x5555 ) ;
5 S = (S & 0x3333 ) + ( ( S >> 2) & 0x3333 ) ;
6 S = (S & 0 x 0 f 0 f ) + ( ( S >> 4) & 0 x 0 f 0 f ) ;
7 Output = (S + (S>>8)) & 0 x f f ;
8 a s s e r t (0 ) ;
9 return Output ;
10 }
Listing 1.6. population count.c
A.3.2 Sub-programs
1 int main (void ) {
2 unsigned short int S0 , S ;
3 S0 = S ;
4 S = (S & 0x5555 ) + ( ( S >> 1) & 0x5555 ) ;
5 a s s e r t (0 ) ;
6 return S ;
7 }
Listing 1.7. population count 3 1.c
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1 int main (void ) {
2 unsigned short int S0 , S ;
3 S0 = S ;
4 S = (S & 0x3333 ) + ( ( S >> 2) & 0x3333 ) ;
5 a s s e r t (0 ) ;
6 return S ;
7 }
Listing 1.8. population count 3 2.c
1 int main (void ) {
2 unsigned short int S0 , S , Output ;
3 S0 = S ;
4 S = (S & 0 x 0 f 0 f ) + ( ( S >> 4) & 0 x 0 f 0 f ) ;
5 Output = (S + (S>>8)) & 0 x f f ;
6 a s s e r t (0 ) ;
7 return Output ;
8 }
Listing 1.9. population count 3 3.c
